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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
MERVIN J. RUSSELL, 
Deceased. 
Case No. P-86-052 
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE J. RUSSELL, GENIAL P. 
RUSSELL, ADA J. RUSSELL and 
HELEN RUSSELL GREEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 87-208 
ADA J. RUSSELL, HENEN J. 
RUSSELL, GENE RUSSELL and 
GENEIL RUSSELL, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 87-213 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the appeal should be dismissed. 
2. Whether the court below required Mr. Allred to 
stipulate to the testimony of his questioned documents examiner. 
Case No. 90-0184 
(Priority No. 16) 
3. Whether the stipulation as given to the jury was 
error, and if so, whether it was harmless error. 
4. Whether Appellants failed to preserve the issue of 
standard of proof for appeal. 
5. Whether the standard of proof on the issue of undue 
influence is by clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. The legal sufficiency of a Notice of Appeal is 
determined by the court as a matter of law and is rooted in the 
proposition, M[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be 
to determine whether the requested action is within its 
jurisdiction. When the matter is outside of the court's 
jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss." Varian-
Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Allred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 350 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reed v. Reed, 
806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2. "In reviewing evidentiary rulings made under 
Rule 403, we will not overturn a trial court absent and abuse of 
discretion, (citing Cases) To constitute an abuse of discretion, 
the error must have been harmful." State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1989) . 
Issue 3. The Standard of Review is the same as Issue 2., 
supra. 
Issue 4. "An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instruction presents a question of law only. Therefore, we grant 
2 
no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." Ramon v. 
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gene J. Russell, as Petitioner, initiated a Formal 
Testacy Proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401 in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Case No. P-86-052 
challenging the validity of the will of Mervin J. Russell dated 
November 9, 1983 and an Agreement Cancelling Antenuptial Agreement 
executed by Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J. Russell dated August 
14, 1982 on the grounds of Mervin J. Russell's lack of testamentary 
capacity, duress and undue influence (R. 1-12). The challenged 
documents were later expanded to include an Agreement Cancelling 
Antenuptial Agreement executed by Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J. 
Russell dated January 25, 1983 and a Quit Claim Deed executed by 
Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J. Russell dated June 25, 1982 which 
documents were challenged on the same grounds (R. 563-567). 
Georgia J. Russell, as Petitioner, initiated an Informal 
Probate Proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Part 3, §75-3-301 
through 11, in the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, 
Case No. P-86-061 seeking to probate the will of Mervin J. Russell 
dated November 9, 1983 (R. 27-29; R. 843, T. 672-674). 
Because of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401(3) 
the Informal Probate Proceedings relating to the will were deferred 
until the disposition of the Formal Testacy Proceeding P-86-052 (R. 
27-29) . 
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Georgia J, Russell, as Plaintiff, brought an action for 
Partition and to Quiet Title to the Mervin J. Russell estate 
against Gene J, Russell, Geneil P. Russell, Ada J. Russell and 
Helen Russell Green as Defendants in the District Court of Tooele 
County, Case No. 87-208. Ada J. Russell, Helen J. Russell, Gene 
Russell and Geneil Russell, as Plaintiffs, brought an action 
against Georgia J. Russell, as Defendant, for Partition and to 
Quiet Title to the Mervin J. Russell estate in the District Court 
of Tooele County, Case No. 87-213 (R. 839, T. 1-7). 
The final resolution of both the actions for Partition 
and to Quiet Title depend on the final disposition of Case No. P-
86-052 relating to the will, the two different executions of the 
Agreement Cancelling Antenuptial Agreement and the Quit Claim Deed 
(R. 839, T. 6,7; R. 724). 
The trial of P-86-052 was held on May 22-25 and 30, 1989 
in the District Court of Tooele County, the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, Trial Judge, which resulted in a Judgment on the Verdict 
entered on June 15, 1989 which was favorable to Appellee (R. 618-
622). Gene J. Russell filed various post-trial motions pursuant 
to Rule 52(b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (R.630-650) 
which motions after argument and submission to the court, were 
denied (R. 723-725). The second Judgment on the Verdict also 
favorable to Appellee was entered on March 7, 1990 (R. 726-738). 
(Addendum 1) 
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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee generally agrees with the Statement of Facts in 
Appellants' brief but feels it necessary to inform the court of the 
following supplemental facts. 
At the time Georgia Russell signed the Antenuptial 
Agreement she owned with her brother a ranch at the mouth of Ophir 
Canyon consisting of 131 acres, cattle and sheep, two tractors, 
bailer, mower, plows, disk, two flatbed trucks, and was employed 
full-time at the Tooele Army Depot South Area (R. 837, T. 4-6).. 
On May 3, 1976, Ada Russell, mother of Gene J. Russell, 
and former wife of Mervin J. Russell, executed a Quit Claim Deed 
in favor of Gene J. Russell and Geniel, his wife, to the one-half 
of the property formerly owned by Ada Russell jointly with Mervin 
J. Russell (R. 842, T. 399, 400; Exhibit 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Notice of Appeal is defective in that it does 
not specify a party taking the appeal who has the legal right to 
appeal and it does not identify the judgment appealed from. The 
appeal is also taken from an Order Denying the Motion for A New 
Trial which cannot be done. 
2. Appellants' attorney, Mr. Allred, voluntarily 
stipulated to the testimony of his questioned documents examiner 
being read as stipulated to the jury. The colloquy between court 
and counsel as set forth in the brief and Addendum 2 shows the 
voluntary nature of the stipulation. 
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3. Assuming the stipulation as read to the jury was 
error, it was harmless error as ruled on specifically by the court• 
The harmless error is also demonstrated in the colloquy between 
court and counsel in the brief and was additionally rendered 
harmless by the findings in the jury verdict (Addendum 1). 
4. Appellants failed to submit a proper request for a 
jury instruction on the standard of proof or undue influence being 
by a preponderance of the evidence and the issue of standard of 
proof for undue influence has not been preserved for appeal. 
5. It has always been the judicial policy in the State 
of Utah as announced in the decided cases to uphold wills against 
claims of fraud and undue influence by requiring substantial proof 
of undue influence. Substantial proof is clear and convincing 
evidence in that clear and convincing evidence is defined as there 
is no serious or substantial doubt as to the issue involved. 
Decided cases provide a clear guide to bench and bar in determining 
testamentary capacity, mental capacity to execute a deed and 
standard of proof for fraud and undue influence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO CONFER 
JURISDICTION ON THE COURT TO HEAR THIS APPEAL. 
Notice of Appeal was filed and served on April 6, 1990 
(R. 826-827). Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with 
memorandum in this Court on May 10, 1990. A reply memorandum was 
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filed by the appealing party on May 20, 1990 together with a Motion 
to Clarify Pleadings which reads as follows: 
The Appellants above-named and Gene J. Russell, 
Petitioner, in the event that there exists some 
confusion as to the Pleadings herein, request 
leave of Court to alter said Pleadings to 
Clarify said Pleadings by inserting after the 
word Plaintiffs, the word "Petitioner" in the 
Notice of Appeal and adding to said Notice that 
the Judgment being Appealed from was entered 
March 7, 1990. 
WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that the Court 
allows such clerical corrections as are 
necessary under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Thus, the Motion to Clarify Pleadings is actually a 
Motion to Amend the Notice of Appeal by adding "Petitioner" to 
"Plaintiffs" as appealing parties and designating the judgment 
appealed. 
The Motion to Clarify Pleadings was never brought on for 
hearing before the Court. 
A. The Notice of Appeal does not specify parties capable 
of taking an appeal. 
Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P., provides in part as follows: 
The notice of appeal shall specify the party 
or parties taking the appeal. 
The Notice of Appeal provides as follows: 
The Plaintiffs above-named and each of them 
hereby Appeal from the Judgement [sic] on the 
Verdict [sic] and Order denying the Motion for 
New Trial; said appeal is taken from the Third 
District Court in and for Tooele, State of Utah 
and appealed to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. 
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The judgments entered on June 16, 1989 and March 7, 1990 
show that it was entered in Case No. P-86-052 wherein Gene J. 
Russell was the Petitioner (R. 618-632, 726-738). The Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment, Motion for New Trial and the Order 
Denying the Motion for New Trial all show the papers were prepared 
and filed in P-86-052 (R. 633-635; 639-650; 723-725). 
It should be noted that Gene J. Russell and Helen J. 
Russell are Plaintiffs in 87-213 and Georgia J. Russell is a 
Plaintiff in 87-208, the Partition and Quiet Title actions. It 
should be further noted that the caption in the upper left of the 
front page of the Notice of Appeal identifying the appealing 
attorney shows Mr. Allred as "Attorney for Petition [sic] Gene 
Russell" (R. 827). 
Paragraph numbered 4 on Page 2 of the Order Denying the 
Motion for New Trial provides that: 
4. The partition claims are stayed until the 
completion of the appellate process or the 
running of the time for appeal without an 
appeal being taken. (R. 724) 
The Partition claims refer to Case Nos. 87-208 and 87-213 (R. 844, 
T. 719, 720). 
Research fails to disclose a Utah case on the proper 
designation of parties in a Notice of Appeal. In the case of Hayes 
v. Haqemeier, 75 N.M. 70, 400 P.2d 945 (1963) co-plaintiffs 
purported to appeal an adverse judgment to the New Mexico Supreme 
Court. The court ruled as follows at 400 P.2d 946: 
A question is presented at the outset as to 
whether Betty Evans perfected an appeal. Both 
the motion and order granting appeal were in 
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the singular. The notice only named Carolyn 
as the appellee. This court has a duty to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction of an 
appeal. . . .The record fails to disclose a timely 
appeal by Betty Evans. 
The same case before the Court of Appeals of Kansas and 
the Kansas Supreme Court illustrate the two views regarding the 
proper designation of parties in a Notice of Appeal. In Brueck v. 
Krinqs, 631 P.2d 1233 (Kan. App. 1981), the Kansas Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal and held as follows at 631 P.2d 1236: 
Appellants contend that this statute should 
not be strictly applied to bar their appeal. 
However, appellate jurisdiction is conferred 
by statute and in the absence of compliance 
with statutory rules an appeal should be 
dismissed....Moreover, (citing case) our 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 
party who was not named in the notice of 
appeal, either directly or by inference, could 
still be regarded as an appellant. The federal 
courts have similarly ruled, noting that only 
the parties named in the notice of appeal are 
brought within the appellate courtfs 
jurisdiction. 
In an appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals was reversed in Brueck v. Krinqs, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982) 
and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled as follows at 638 P.2d 906: 
Notice of appeal is governed by K.S.A. 60-
2103, which section provides in part: 
11
 (b) The notice of appeal shall specify 
the parties taking the appeal.... 
That section must be read in the light of 
K.S.A. 60-102, which provides: 
"The provisions of this act shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action 
or proceeding." 
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The latter section was intended to be applied 
to the entire Code of Civil Procedure, 
including K.S.A. 60-2103.... 
• * * 
We hold that the notice was sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction upon the appellate courts, 
and we conclude that the appeal should not be 
dismissed. 
K.S.A. 60-102 is the same as Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is not included in the Utah R. App. P. 
However, this court dismissed the appeal in the case of 
Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 
798 (1964) with the following language at 388 P.2d 800: 
....the object of a notice of appeal is to 
advise the opposite party that an appeal has 
been taken from a specific judgment in a 
particular case. Respondent is entitled to 
know specifically which judgment is being 
appealed. 
The language of the Nunley case, supra, should be equally 
applicable to the designation of the "party or parties taking the 
appeal." Form 1 of the Utah R. App. P., provides with respect to 
the designation of parties as follows: 
Notice is hereby given that [plaintiff] 
[ d e f e n d a n t ] and a p p e l l a n t , 
name ...appeals to the Utah... 
This appeal was taken by "Plaintiffs" of which Appellee 
Georgia J. Russell is one in Case No. 87-208. No "plaintiffs" have 
an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court and the Notice of Appeal is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court to hear the same. 
B. The Notice of Appeal fails to designate which 
judgment on the verdict is being appealed. 
10 
There are two judgments the verdict in Case No. P-86-
052, to wit: The one entered on June 16, 1989 and the one entered 
on March 7, 1990. Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P. further provides in 
part: 
The notice of appeal...shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed 
from... 
Form 1, Utah R. App. P., provides: 
...appeals...the final [judgment] [order] of 
the Honorable (name) entered in this 
matter on (date) . 
"Plaintiffs" have failed to designate which judgment is 
being appealed or the date of the entry of the judgment being 
appealed. The language of Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 
supra, is directly applicable to this deficiency in the Notice of 
Appeal on file herein. 
Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P. does not require the inclusion 
of the name of counsel for the appealing party or for the matter 
the name of the trial judge as court probably refers to the 
specific district court. Form 1, R. of App. P., apparently 
requires the inclusion of the name of the appealing attorney, trial 
judge and the date of the entry of the judgment which items are not 
included in the Notice of Appeal on file herein. 
C. An appeal cannot be taken from an Order Denying a 
Motion for a New Trial. 
"Plaintiffs" include in the Notice of Appeal that they 
are appealing the "Order Denying the Motion for New Trial." 
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In Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 7 Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 
(1966) this court ruled, under former Rules 59(a)(4) and 72(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the material portion of Rule 72(a) 
being represented in Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P., as follows at 409 
P.2d 973: 
This appeal is abortive, being from the denial 
of a motion for a new trial. 
The appeal should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
MR. ALLRED VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO THE STIPULATION RELATING 
TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF HIS WITNESS. 
The Appellantfs brief states at page 15, !f...the court 
abused its discretion when it forced the contestant [appellant] to 
stipulate away its right to present testimony." And at page 16, 
"Contestants [appellants'] counsel objected to being forced into 
any stipulation regarding his expert's testimony...." 
Although Appellants' counsel, Mr. Allred, stated 
preliminary and rhetorically, "I don't think I should be in a 
position where I am forced into a stipulation." (R. 835, T. 9), he 
nevertheless agreed to the stipulation as given to the jury (R. 
835, T. 12-15). 
The following is the sequence of events regarding the 
stipulation proceedings as set forth in the record: 
MR. ABLES: Your Honor, may be approach the 
bench for a minute? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
(Conference at bench.) 
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THE COURT: This is going to take a little 
longer than I thought. We are going to excuse 
the jury for a new minutes while we work 
something out here. 
Will you take them in the jury room or somewhere, Mr. 
Gochis? We will proceed with this matter. 
(Jury exits the courtroom.) 
(The transcript of the stipulation 
proceedings was previously transcribed 
and can be found in a separate volume.) 
(R. 840, T. 152, 153) 
The entire stipulation proceedings held out of the 
hearing of the jury are included as Addendum 2 (R. 835, T. 3-15). 
The stipulation was formulated at (R. 835, T. 4-12, Ln. 14), and 
restated and agreed to at (R. 835, T. 12, Ln. 15-15) as follows: 
Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr. Abies? 
MR. ABLES: May I hear it one more time? I 
think it is brief, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. In November of 1988 — this 
witness examined some documents in November of 
1988. She gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that 
the August 14th document was not signed by 
Mervin Russell in her opinion. Secondly, that 
it was signed by some other person attempting 
to disguise their own handwriting. That on May 
11th or 12th of 1989 she came to the conclusion 
and indicated to Mr. Allred that the person who 
had signed it was Georgia Russell. And 
secondly that there are two other documents 
which she looked at, one dated January 12th, 
1984 -- exhibit what? Do you know? 
* ic -k 
THE COURT: And January 26, '87 document is 
what? 
MR. ALLRED: Yes. That's 60. 
THE COURT: 60? Those documents were signed -
- were -- were to signed by Mervin Russell but 
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in her opinion they were not signed by someone 
attempting to disguise their handwriting. 
MR, ABLES: That's right, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's call the jury back in. 
The jury was brought back into the courtroom and the 
following took place: 
THE COURT: The record will show that all the 
members of the jury are in their places. We 
talked to the lawyers while you where [sic] out 
and they have come to sort of a stipulations 
which is sometimes stated during the course of 
trial. To save time, the lawyers will agree 
that certain testimony, certain ones who 
testify in certain ways, they just agree so 
there is no disputing the witness. So that's 
the case here; they have agreed to certain 
facts and you are to take these facts and 
assume them to be correct. Therefore, the 
witness won't have to testify. 
You will see in evidence a document which is 
dated August 14, 198__ — what is it dated? 
MR ALLRED: '2. 
It is an unnotarized agreement canceling the 
antenuptial, Exhibit Number --
THE COURT: What is the exhibit number? 
MR. ALLRED: Number 30. 
THE COURT: It is an agreement canceling the 
antenuptial agreement. 
MR. ALLRED: Number 30, yes. 
THE COURT: The document examiner will testify 
that she examined that document, along with 
other sample signatures, and came to the 
conclusion that the document was not signed by 
Merv Russell; that is, that his name was not 
signed by him, that it was in fact signed by 
someone who was attempting to disguise their 
own handwriting. She came to that conclusion 
and gave her opinion to Mr. Allred in November 
of 1988. 
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Later, on May 11th or 12th, just 10 or 11 days 
ago, she came to the further conclusion that 
the person who had signed that document was 
Georgia Russell. She gave that opinion to Mr. 
Allred at that time. 
She would also testify that two other 
documents, one dated January 12, 1984 and one 
dated January 26, 1987, which will be marked 
Exhibit 57-A and Exhibit 60, were also not 
signed by Merv Russell, but the person who 
signed his name on those documents was not in 
any way attempting to disguise their own 
signature. 
I believe that is the extent of the 
stipulation; is that right, Mr. Allred. 
• * * 
THE COURT: The lawyers agree that would be 
this witness's testimony if she continued to 
testify, and based upon that, the witness has 
been excused. 
Are you ready to call your next witness, Mr. 
Allred? 
MR. ALLRED: Yes, we would call Helen Russell 
at this time. 
There is not one iota of evidence in these stipulation 
proceedings to support the claim of Mr. Allred that he "stipulated 
away" his "right to present testimony" or was "forced into any 
stipulation regarding his expertfs testimony." Mr. Allred 
voluntarily stipulated to the testimony of Christine Thornburry as. 
formulated above being presented to the jury. 
None of the cases cited in support of the idea Mr. Allred 
was forced into a stipulation are applicable. What is applicable, 
are the cases of Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); and Richins v. 
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Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.# 817 P.2d 832 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
wherein stipulating parties became unhappy about their stipulations 
voluntarily entered into and tried unsuccessfully to avoid the 
consequences of the same. 
It should also be noted that Mr. Allred failed to 
specifically object to the trial court that he had been forced to 
stipulate his right away to present testimony or that he was forced 
to entered into the stipulation he entered into so the trial court 
could make a ruling as to the voluntariliness of the stipulation. 
When Mr. Allred brought the matter back before the court 
at (R. 842, T. 432-439) his only concern was that the stipulation 
given to the jury was not correct and had nothing to do this his 
being forced into the stipulation or waiving his right to present 
testimony. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate 
that Mr. Allred's stipulation was anything but voluntary. 
POINT III 
THE STIPULATION READ TO THE JURY WAS WHAT WAS STIPULATED 
TO BY COUNSEL AND IF ERROR, WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
The whole purpose of having the conference out of the 
hearing of the jury relating to the testify of Christine Thornburry 
was to present to the jury what she would testify to if questions 
relating to the signature on the unnotarized Cancellation of 
Antenuptial Agreement (Exhibit 30) dated August 14, 1982. The 
highlights of the stipulation as formulated are as follows: 
THE COURT: Hold on a second. She is going to 
testify that the August 14th document was not 
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signed by Mer Russell; that it was signed by 
someone who was attempting to disguise their 
own handwriting; and the other documents are 
just comparison documents which she used to 
make this conclusion? (R. 835, T. 3, Ln. 25, 
Ln. 1-5) 
THE COURT: Hold on. Now are you going to 
-- Mr. Abies, are you going to contest either 
to those two facts: Either that this document 
of August 14th was not signed by Merv Russell 
or that it was signed by someone attempting to 
disguise their own handwriting? 
MR. ABLES: It was signed by Georgia Russell 
on August 14th, we stipulate to that. And I 
think that question of disguising, I don't 
think that's relevant at all. She had admitted 
she signed it. (R. 835, T. 4, Ln. 23-25, T. 
5, Ln. 1-6) 
THE COURT: It is relevant. My question is do 
you agree to it? It is clearly relevant. She 
is going to say looks like someone disguising 
their handwriting. There is no question it is 
relevant. If your objection is relevancy I 
will overrule that objection. If you will 
stipulate to that, then she doesn't need to 
testify. So you just say and we can get on 
with it. (R. 835, T. 5, Ln. 19-25) 
I just need to know whether you agree to it, 
Mr. Abies. 
MR. ABLES: All right. We will stipulate to 
that. 
THE COURT: What we are going to tell the jury, 
then, is that you will agree that she examined 
the documents. When? (R. 835, T. 6, Ln. 9-
14) 
THE COURT: At that time she gave you her 
conclusions, which are that, number one, the 
August 14th signature of Mer Russell was not 
written by him; and secondly, that in her 
opinion it was written by someone attempting 
to disguise their own handwriting. 
MR. ABLES: That's right. (R. 835, T. 6, Ln. 
23-25, T. 7, Ln. 1-3) 
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Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr. Abies? 
MR. ABLES: May I hear it one more time? I 
think it is brief, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. In November of 1988 — this 
witness examined some documents in November of 
1988. She gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that 
the August 14th document was not signed by 
Mervin Russell in her opinion. Secondly, that 
it was signed by some other person attempting 
to disguise their own handwriting. That on 
May 11th or 12th of 1989 she came to the 
conclusion and indicated to Mr. Allred that 
the person who had signed it was Georgia 
Russell. And secondly that there are two other 
documents which she looked at, one dated 
January 12th, 1984 -- exhibit what? Do you 
know? (R. 835, T. 12, Ln. 15-25, T. 13, Ln. 
1-3) 
• * • 
THE COURT: 60? Those documents were signed -
- were -- were not signed by Mervin Russell but 
in her opinion they were not signed by someone 
attempting to disguise their handwriting. 
MR. ABLES: That's right, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's call the jury back in. 
MR. ABLES: In addition to that we stipulated 
-- we did stipulate in addition to the opinion 
of the examiner -- we stipulated that Mrs. 
Russell signed the document dated August 14th 
of 1982, whatever number it bears, and also 
she signed exhibits 57 and 60. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ALLRED: I don't think that should be part 
of the stipulation. I think it should show 
that they are stipulating to the testimony as 
accurate, and not get in there to start out 
making their excuses. 
THE COURT: I guess that's right. 
MR. ABLES: We aren't going to enter testimony 
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MR. ALLRED: I am sure you are going to. You 
have got all that right. 
THE COURT: You can put that in. That's not 
part of this witness's testimony. (R. 835, T. 
13, Ln. 20-25, T. 14, Ln. 1-16) 
After the stipulation was given by the trial court to the 
jury (R. 840, T. 153, 154), supra Point II, the following occurred: 
MR. ALLRED: I think their agreement was they 
admitted she signed it, admitted it was 
disguised. 
MR. ABLES: No, we didn't do that. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MR. ABLES: Absolutely not. 
THE COURT: That was the agreement. 
MR. ABLES: No, it wasn't. 
THE COURT: I think — just a minute. Approach 
the bench, please. 
(A side bar conference was held.) 
THE COURT: The lawyers agree that would be 
this witness's testimony if she continued to 
testify, and based upon that, the witness has 
been excused. 
Are you ready to call your next witness, Mr. 
Allred? 
MR. ALLRED: Yes, we would call Helen Russell 
at this time. (R. 840, T. 155, Ln. 1-17) 
Appellee's attorney stipulated to the proposed testimony 
of Christine Thornburry as set forth above and was willing to 
stipulate to the fact that Georgia Russell had executed Exhibit 30, 
but not to the fact that Georgia Russell, according to Christine 
Thornburry, attempted to disguise her handwriting. Assuming, 
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arguendo, that the stipulation given by the trial court to the jury 
was in error, it was harmless error for the following reasons: 
1. Mr. Allred brought the matter up again at (R. 842, 
T. 432-439) and even confused the trial court into thinking that 
Mr. Abies stipulated that Georgia Russell had attempted to disguise 
her handwriting (R. 842, T. 436). The trial court solved the 
problem by making the following ruling at (R. 842, T. 438, 439): 
THE COURT: Well, I admit to having made an 
error in this situation, but I think it is a 
small one and I don't think it takes a lot to 
-- I think it is fairly harmless. I don't 
think it takes a lot to solve the problem. I 
think we will leave the stipulation as it is 
with the understanding that Mr. Abies is not 
going to ask questions that would allow Mrs. 
Russell to deny that she disguised the 
handwriting. 
Then you can argue to the jury we have this 
testimony from the examiner, that it was 
disguised and it is unrefuted, that she didn't 
ever deny it. And I think if you can do that, 
that will solve the problem. 
2. Instruction 36 to the jury provided: 
You are instructed that Georgia J. Russell's 
signature of Mervin J. Russell's name to the 
Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement dated 
August 14, 1982 [Exhibit 30] was proper if she 
signed it in his presence and by his direction 
(R. 574). 
The jury found in its special verdict that the 
Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement of August 14, 1982 (Exhibit 
30) was signed by Georgia J. Russell in the presence of Mervin J. 
Russell and at his direction (R. 566). The jury's finding was made 
in spite of the unrefuted stipulated testimony that Georgia Russell 
attempted to disguise her handwriting and it is to be seriously 
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relating to the proof of undue influence by clear and convincing 
evidence, they failed to submit a written request for a standard 
of proof instruction on the issues in the case (R. 505-561) (R.508, 
509 are Appellee's instructions erroneously included in Appellants' 
requests.) 
Failure to request an instruction on the standard of 
proof as applied to the case constitutes a waiver. Rule 51, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; Romrell v. W.W. Clyde Co., 534 P.2d 867 
(Utah 1977). 
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
In order for a party to take advantage of a 
failure to give a correct instruction, he must 
have proposed such correct instruction and 
excepted to the trial court's failure to give 
it. Williamson v. Denver and R. G. W. R. Co., 
26 Utah 178, 487 P.2d 316; Morgan v. Pistone, 
25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839. 
In the case of Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 
P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975) the main opinion ruled as follows at 538 P.2d 
1037: 
The appellant claims that the court erred in 
not clearly instructing the jury that the 
defendants had the burden of proof to show 
probable grounds existed for detaining the 
plaintiff. 
The answer to that contention is that the 
appellant did not tender a written instruction 
to cover the matter. 
This ruling was made in spite of the fact that Appellant orally 
excepted to the burden of proof instruction given by the court. 
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substitute the will and judgment of the jury 
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his son's education and support during his 
mi nority. The judgment of the jury may be 
soui ider and wiser than that of the father, but 
that is no reason whatever for substituting 
the judgment of the forir."• c ~? ; r the 
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latter. The law of this state gives "every 
person over the age of eighteen years, of sound 
mind," the right to dispose of his property by 
will as to him seems just and right. If this 
right may be invaded simply because a court or 
jury may not be able to agree with his 
property, or because he has not made an 
adequate allowance for a specific purpose, then 
the right had better be abrogated entirely. 
The dissent stated at 134 P. 558: 
I think there is sufficient evidence to support 
the special findings and verdict, and for that 
reason dissent. 
A reading of the Anderson case clearly indicates a 
standard of proof greater that a preponderance of the evidence in 
proving the procurement of a document by undue influence. 
The case of In Re Hansen's Will, 167 P. 256 (Utah 1917) 
is not cited in Appellants' brief but is relied on heavily in the 
Amicus Curiae brief in establishing preponderance of the evidence 
as the standard of proof for undue influence in will contest. 
The quotation appearing at p. 2 of the Amicus Curiae 
brief misquotes the case. The first complete sentence should 
conclude as follows, "...[O]ought to be fairly established by a 
preponderance of proof." instead of the misquote which reads, 
"...[O]ought to be fairly established by a preponderance of the 
evidence." 
Also, the quotation at p. 2 of the Amicus Curiae brief 
from the Hansen case is preceded by the following introductory 
sentence at 157 P. 259: 
With respect to the issue of undue influence, 
however, the district court erred in holding 
that the burden of proof rests on the 
proponent. The great weight of authority is 
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A nough the court ;; : ot expressly state that 
a contestant's bu-d^n of proving undue 
inf.! tern e •,, \r* by i preponderance of the 
evilen-^r t\> .-MJ • ,*-*.. ^ -ri-is / 
t< <.o us ion, 
is a m.is interpret at i r the •':. .rt'5 decision. 
T: 
If he was .-i > .nd and di s posing mind and 
memory when he made it, the jury found that he 
was, then, under the law, he had the sole right 
to choose the objects of his bounty, and it is 
utterly immaterial whether what he did is 
approved or disapproved by either court or 
jury Tha t :i right i t is to the duty of the 
courts to protect and enforce, and not to 
fritter it away by entering a judgment which 
perhaps reflects only their own views, or the 
views of the jury, regarding the disposition 
a testator shoi i] d have made of h i s property, 
Th :i s i s a law case, and, in vi ew of that fact, 
we have .no right, nor have we the inclination 
if we had the right, to interfere with the 
findings of the jury in such a case where such 
findings are based upon any substantial 
evidence. We may, however, not disregard both 
our duty and our oaths of office and permit a 
judgment to stand, unless it is based upon 
findings which are based upon some substantial 
legal evidence. There is no such evidence in 
this case upon the issue of undue influence, 
and hence the findi ng of the jury is not 
sanctioned by law. As a matter of law we are 
required, therefore, to set the findings and 
judgment asj de (emphasis added) 
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The standard of proof adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in determining whether a will was procured by undue influence is 
set forth in the case of In Re Lavelle's Estate/ 122 Utah 253, 248 
P.2d 372 (1952) at 375, 376 as follows: 
To declare a will invalid because of undue 
influence, there must be an exhibition of more 
than influence or suggestion, there must be 
substantial proof of an overpowering of the 
testator's volition at the time the will was 
made, to the extent he is impelled to do that 
which he would not have done had he been free 
from such controlling influence, so that the 
will represents the desire of the person 
exercising the influence rather than that of 
the testator, (emphasis added) 
To the same effect see In Re George's Estate, 112 P.2d 498, 499, 
500 (Utah 1941); In Re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P.2d 1106, 1112 
(Utah 1938) • 
The case of In Re Buttars' Estate, 261 P.2d 171 (Utah 
1953) did nothing to the change the "substantial proof" cases 
contrary to the assertion in the Amicus Curiae brief at p. 3. The 
complete sentence from the Buttars case is as follows at 261 P.2d 
172: 
By this evidence the proponents made out a 
prima facie case entitling the will to be 
admitted to probate and it then became 
incumbent on the contestants to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the testatrix 
did not have a sound and disposing mind at the 
time she executed the will or that she was 
acting under fraud, menace or undue influence. 
In Re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256. 
The quoted sentence deals with the burden of proof and the 
reference to proof by a preponderance of the evidence refers only 
to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and not to undue 
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was eccentric inn her actions and forgetful at 
time of some things, but is utterly 
insufficient to sustain the contestants1 burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that she lacked testamentary capacity at. the 
t, i HIP she executed the will . 
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*w ^s states *** J^ w.^.J. Wills section 251 P. 1122 as 
According to some authorities, a preponderance 
of the evidence is necessary and sufficient to 
establish undue influence in the execution of 
a \ i J! II I lowever, in numerous cases , it has 
been said that undue influence, invalidating 
a will, must be established by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence by 
compelling evidence, or by the manifest weight 
of the evidence. In any event undue influence 
in the execution of a will must be shown by 
substantial evidence and evidence which merely 
raises a suspicion or conjecti ire that the w i n 
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was the product of undue influence is 
insufficient.... (emphasis added) 
Standard of proof is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 
Abridged Fifth Edition, 1983 as follows: 
Standard of Proof. A statement of how 
convincing the evidence must be in order for 
a party to comply with his/her burden of proof. 
The main standards of proof are proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt (in criminal cases only), 
proof by clear and convincing evidence, and 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
standard of proof for establishing undue influence in the 
procurement of a deed is by clear and convincing evidence. 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 
1952). The case of Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949) 
contains the only extended discussion at P. 202-205 as to the 
meaning of clear and convincing evidence to be found in Utah case 
law. Clear and convincing evidence is finally defined in 
Northcrest, Inc., supra, and Greener, as follows at 212 P. 2d 205: 
But for a matter to be clear and convincing to 
a particular mind it must at least have reached 
the point where there remains no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion. 
"No serious or substantial doubt" as to the issue of 
undue influence has to mean "substantial proof" which is clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Fraud and undue influence go together like a "horse and 
carriage" and it is usual to see these two defenses asserted 
together in contesting a will or setting aside a deed. Again, the 
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard of proof for fraud as 
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...•the burden of showing undue influence in 
the execution of the deed is even greater than 
that of showing incompetence. It must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the grantee exercised a dominating 
influence over the grantor. 
The case of Blankenship v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1981) also appears to have adopted the preponderance of 
evidence standard to establish the incompetency of a grantor. The 
Court held at 622 P.2d 808: 
Even though it may plausibly be contended that 
the evidence would support a contrary finding, 
we are not persuaded that there is no 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support the 
trial court's finding that at the time he made 
the assignment to his wife, Dee E. Christensen 
lacked mental capacity and that the assignment 
was thus invalid and passed no interest in the 
property to her. 
This could not be by clear and convincing evidence as this standard 
requires the evidence to be such that there is no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the conclusion. Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker 
Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). 
Thus, undue influence is undue influence whether it 
presents itself in a deed contest or a will contest. Undue 
influence, reduced to its simplest terms, is a substitution of the 
will or the grantee-devisee for that of the grantor-testator. In 
In Re Lavelle's Estate, supra, it is stated: 
[S]o that the will represents the desire of the 
person exercising the influence rather than 
that of the testator. 
And Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978) says: 
It must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the grantee exercised a 
dominating influence over the grantor. 
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discretion ; r. relation mereto, or * •: 
Peterson v. Carter : ' • ." : 9788 - Anderson v. Thomas, 
108 I - o :."'•:.
 r . . . , -;;•;-?'-
I / I" . M / i'l) I 
The menta - . - a c i t y r e c e s s a r v t , ^ X P O I I . P a --alio • as 
] Il I' ( '1,1 I ,*( h i M III I I II I I I I III I O p O d I I Hi II | II I | M i l l l l J p J OHIO L U ' I i l l I. H"» II IN I II I I s S , 
The classic test general testamentary 
capacity has three elements: to make a will, 
one must be able to (1) identify the natural 
objects of one's boundary and recognize one's 
relationship to them, (2) recall the nature and 
extent of one's property, and (3) dispose of 
one's property understandingly, according to 
a p] an formed i n one's mind, 
Matter of Estate of Kesler, 7 02 P. 2d 86 (I It all i 1 9 85); Re Estate of 
» o l t e i i Il • ; 1 7 1 .1 > 2 il 2 9 4 04 I 2 il 2 Il (111 96 5 ) j Ii l Re E s t a be of Swan, 
* I J tah 2d 27 7 i l ( 293 P. 2d 682 (1 9 5 6 ) . 
T h u s , t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t J y r e d u c e d ] eve J o f m e n t a ] 
i i ipcn • i L v" 11eces s a r y t o e x e c u t e a va] ii ::il , :ii ] Ill w 1 i :ii c: • 1 i :i nd i c a t e s a 
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judicial policy in favor of upholding the validity of a will as 
being a once in a life-time, solemn document disposing of a 
testator's entire estate. As a necessary corollary to this policy, 
it is submitted that a higher standard of proof be necessary to set 
a will aside, to wit: clear and convincing evidence. 
Appellants argue at p. 27 of their brief in support of 
the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for undue influence 
that, "Deeds are effective on delivery without notice to third 
parties.11 A will is also effective upon its date of execution 
without notice to interested parties and is effective to vest title 
in a devisee upon the death of testator and prior to probate 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-101 and under certain 
circumstances set forth in § 75-3-102 can be used to make transfers 
of real property without the necessity of probate or notice to any 
persons. 
Appellants1 brief then states that "Deeds rarely, if 
ever, show undue influence upon their face.11 The exact same thing 
can be said with reference to wills. 
Appellant's then argue at p. 28, "Third parties may rely 
upon a recorded deed long before parties injured by undue influence 
learn of the injury." Third parties may also be put into the 
position of relying upon the representations of a testator long 
before they are injured by any alleged undue influence and so the 
considerations are exactly the same. 
The standard of proof to show undue influence in a will 
contest is or ought to be by clear and convincing evidence as the 
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t e s t a t o r i s dpad and qonc
 :r l a l i ena^ r a i s e d and -t-
|)MI i 1 i i y i i I ( 111 i i mi 1 I I In in I i I 
i lorir and convincing evidence * _ ;t> .: .uence 
The appeal r^^1 ijsm.\:^ c* -1 ternat. i * - he 
judgment on the verdict should be affi rmed. 
R e s p e c t fin I I "j, is ml) in i I I i "d 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Appellee 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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I hereby certify that on the -^  \Jr day of August, 1992, 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to J. Franklin Allred, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, Brant H. Wall, Wall & Wall, Suite 800 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Charles M. 
Bennett, McCallister, Duncan & Nebeker, Suite 800 Kennecott 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133. 
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J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene J. Russell 
321 South €00 East' 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OP MERYIN J. RUSSELL/ ) 
Deceased. ) 
Consolidated With ) 
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL/ ) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
v. ) 
GENE. J. RUSSELL/ GENEIL P. ) 
RUSSELL/ ADA J. RUSSELL and ) 
HELEN RUSSELL GREEN/ ) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. 87-208 ) 
Consolidated With ) 
ADA J. RUSSELL/ HELEN J. ) 
RUSSELL/ GENE RUSSELL and ) 
GENEIL RUSSELL/ His Wife/ ) 
Plaintiffs/ ) 
v» ) 
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL/ ) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 87-213 ) 
JUDGMENT ON 
Probate No. 
Judge Scott 
THE VERDICT 
P-86-052 
Daniels 
ADDENDUM I 
tf above iriattwi . * ". -. s* - ; ~ " ~ 2 r , 
19 39 b e f o r e : . r * b l ~ c ^ * t Dani„ 
i -•*;-- - . - - o e i n c M-preser : e d 
i ^ r . e : : a i t o r r c : . . , 
I . J 1 1 !* fj i n - p r e s e n t e d -\ , >-r ^ t t c r r . t - ; - t n a e l * A D i t i . ^ 3 
;.ne court" lid . HCOJ. * * t t e r a~ :: 
0 3 t h p a r t i e p r o d u c e c examined *n 
vi:.r)y!5b(.i,. - . I D i t s x n i : e1 ' .derc- ~ • ht c 
: . dv :ng i n s t r c -,r a r»* <~*oui . -
-.:-* i . *• ~r h a v : • ^ L.*r-
- u e c :. - : .-.. - : / . o n e s and t**w j - - y h a v i n g 
a n s w e r e d t h e sa'ne. as f o J I o w s ; 
1 . , ii i i ' ' l i i >• n ,' p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e 
i h a i Mervin J , r u s b e l l JUKI t h e m e n t a l ^a[)cv i i »« i » u l c : 
A. ' 1 ^ i^Ui.1 - a. Deed d a t e d June J :
 f iub,1 I 
i1 e s
 t _ 
No X 
"R i J 11. i" ^ r i -liauujj ox Antenuptial Agreement dated 
Augus t ] 4, 198-" ' 
Yes 
No X 
m^ r* 2 n c e l l a t ; " n o* . e c 
n a r y 2 5 <? 
NO 
n £ 
D. The Will dated November 9, 1983? 
Yes X 
No 
2. Do you find from clear and convincing evidence 
that the following documents were procured by the undue influence 
of Georgia J. Russell? 
A. The Quit Claim Deed dated June 25, 1982? 
Yes 
No X 
B. The Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement dated 
August 14, 1982? 
Yes 
No X 
C. The Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement dated 
January 25, 1983? 
Yes 
NO X 
D. The Will dated November 9, 1983? 
Yes 
No X 
3. Do you find a preponderance of the evidence that 
Georgia J. Russell signed the Cancellation of Antenuptial 
Agreement dated August 14, 1982 in the presence of Mervin J. 
Russell and at his direction? 
Yes X 
No 
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The jury made further findings as follows: 
We the jurors in the above-entitled matter find the 
Will of Mervin J, Russell to be [ x ] Valid 
[ ] Invalid 
We the jurors in the above-entitled matter find the 
Deed dated June 25, 1982 to be [ ] Valid 
[ x ] Invalid 
We the jurors in the above-entitled matter find the 
Agreement to Cancel Antenuptial Agreement dated August 14, 1982 
unnctarized (Exhibit 30) to be [ ] Valid 
[ x ] Invalid 
We the jurors in the above-entitled matter find the 
Acreement to Cancel Antenuptial Agreement dated January 25, 1983 
notarized (Exhibit 3) to be [ x ] Valid 
[ ] Invalid 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing answers by the 
;ury, the court does hereby ORDER judgment entered as follows: 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
1. That certain AGREEMENT CANCELLING ANTENUPTIAL 
AGREEMENT dated August 14, 1982, and having no notarial executed 
thereon is hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid. 
2. That certain AGREEMENT CANCELLING ANTENUPTIAL 
AGREEMENT dated August 14, 1982, and having been notarized by 
Edwin Skeen on January 25, 1983, is hereby adjudged and decreed 
to be valid. 
3. That certain WILL dated November 9/ 1983/ and 
being identified as the Last Will and Testiment of Mervin R. 
Russell and bearing two signatures is adjudged and decreed to be 
valid/ and is hereby admitted to probate in the above-entitled 
Court. 
4. That certain QUIT CLAIM DEED/ a copy of which is 
copied herein and identified as. 
c 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA J, RUSSELL, hit wife, 
grantors, of Ophir, County of Tooele, State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM to MERVIN J, RUSSELL and CEORCIA J, RUSSELL, his 
wife, as Joint tenants, Grantees, of Ophir, County of Tooele, 
State of Utah, for the sum of Ten and no/100 Dollars, and other 
good and valuable consideration, the following described tracts 
of land in Tooele County, State of Utah; 
East H of Northwest k\ South k of Northeast k of 
Seceion 8, Twp, 6 South of Range 5 Wesc, S.L.M, 
containing 160 acres; 
ALSO? Northeast k\ East H of Northwest k] Lots I and 2, 
of Section 7, Twp. 7 South of Range 5 West, 
S.L.M. Cont. 319.76 acres; 
ALSO: The Southeast of Northwest * and lots 2 and 3, of 
Section 31, Twp. 5 South, Range 5 West, S.L.M, 
except a tract of 8 acres com, at the Southeast 
corner of Lot,3, thence North 10 chs; thence West 
3 chs; thence'Souch 10 chs; thence East 8 chs to 
beg, except right of way over 1.39 acres granted 
to State Road Comm, containing 107.73 acres; 
ALSO: West k of Southwest k, Section 17, Twp, 6 South, 
Range 5 Wesc, S.L.M, Cont. 80 ocres; 
ALSO: The South k of Seceion 2, Twp, 3 South, Range 4 
West, S.L.M. Cone, 320 acres. 
ALSO: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and Northeast k of Section 11, 
twp 5 South of Range 4 West, S,L,M, Cont. 309,47 
Acres, 
Commencing 9.60 chains South of the Northwest 
corner of Section 29, Township 5 South, Range 5 
West; thence Norch 81° 15' East 20.20 chains; 
thence Souch 5 chains; thence South 81°15' West 
20.20 chains; thence North 5 chains to the place 
of beginning, 
PARCEL 1» The Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter and 
Lots 2 and 3 of Section 31, Township 5 South, Range i West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
EXCEPTINC THEREFROM the following described property: 
Commencing ac the Soucheasc corner oil said Loc 3 and running 
(\ 
thence West 8 chains; chence Norch 10 chains; thence East 8 
chains; thence South 10 chains to che point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Tha South half of ScctionJi, Township 3 South. 
Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 3; Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and the Northeast quarter of 
Section XXi Township 5 South. Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Bast and 
Meridian, 
PARCEL 4: The Vest half of the Northwest quarter; the 
Northwest quarter of Che Souchwesc quarter of Seccion ^ 3 , 
Township 5 Souch, Range 4_H«*C» Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 5: The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Stction 21, Township j S.ouch, Range L.Wast, Salt Lake Bait and 
Maridian; the Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section JJ, Township J_5euch, Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; Lots 1 and 2 ar.d che Souchwest quarter of the 
.Vortheas: quarter :/ 5ec:::r. j.. Township $ South. Range 4 Vtsc . 
Sa.r L<a,'<e 2as« ir.c ,^.-;::i.-.. 
PARCEL $1 The Black Shale Lode mining claim, Lot 3029, 
containing 19.945 acres; Vest Shore, Selma, Sister Mary, Vast 
Selma, Four o'clock, Esther, Alice, Maggie Kelly, Konast Dick, 
Lola Barker and Black Sheep Lode mining claims, Lot No. 3164, 
containing 184,22 acres; Douglas No. 1 and Douglas No, 2 lode 
mining claims, Lot No, 31<«2, concaining 26,156 acres; Cold 
Button, Buena Visca, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No. 2 and Mary 
Jean Fraction lode mining claims, Loc No. 3231, containing 
57.127 acres; Hecla, Hecla No, 1, Hecla No. 3, Hecla No. 3, and 
Hecla No. 4 lode mining claims, Loc No. 3079, containing 66.27 
acres; Syndicate No. I, Syndicace No. 2, Monopolist Nos. 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3487, 
containing 107.04 acres; Crannet Mountain lode mining claim, 
Lot No. 3681, Quartet No, 1, Kansas Boy, Kansas Boy Fraction, 
Kansas Boy No. 3 and Kansas Boy No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot 
No. 3935, concaining 80.972 acres; Edna May, Louis No. 1, Louis 
No. 2 and Louis No. 3 lode mining claims, Loc No. 3381, 
containing 68,733 acres; Ivar.hoe, Coin, Albion and Try Again 
lode mining claims, Loc No. 4192, concaining 64.376 acres; all 
situated in Camp Floyd Mining District, in said County and 
State; also Cold Bug No, 1, Cold Bug No, 3, Cold Bug No. 3 and 
Cold Bug No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3356, concaining 
55.20 acres; and Senator Stewart, Cedar Hill and Dolly Faunce 
lode mining claims, concaining 61'. 9 21 acres, situaced in Ophir 
Mining District in said Councy and Stace. 
EXCEPTING land for highway known as Projecc Ho. DE-2 situated 
in Louis Claim No, 3 of Mineral Survey No. 3381 in S e c t i o n ^ 
Township 6 South. Range 4_y.es t, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Said tract of land is 10'0'Teec wide, 50 feet on each side of 
the center line of survey of said project. Said cencer line is 
described as follows; 
Beginning ac che incersection of the Southeasterly 
boundary line of said Louis Claim No, 3 and said center line of 
survey at Engineer's Station 7 7 3*231 which point is 
approximately 225 feec North 63°20' East along said 
Southeasterly boundary line from chfSouchwesc corner of said 
Louis Claim No, 3; thence Northwesterly 243.3 feet along the 
arc of a 1°00' curve to the left (Note: Tangent to said curve 
•2-
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at its point of beginning bears North 44*09* West) to the 
intersection of said center line of survey at Engineer's 
Station 775*66,3,and a 1*"* perpendicular to said center line 
of survey, which-point'is approximately 70 feet North and 
approximately 1383 feet Norch 46*35' West from the East quarter 
corner of laid Section 4t as shown on the official map of said 
Sroject on file in the office of the State Road Commission of tah. Above described tract of l'and contains 0*56 of an acre, 
of which 0.55 of an acre, more or less, is now occupied by tht 
existing highway, Balance 0.01 of an acre, more or lass. 
PARCEL 7: Lots 1 and 4 in Block 16 of the St, John Town Plat. 
PARCEL 8; Lots 4, 5, and 6 in Block 1 of the St. John Pasture 
Flat. ' ' 
PARCEL 9; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Southwest 
quarter of Section ££, Township £..$.outh, Range JLJ^ost, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; running thence North 9,5 chains; thence 
West 20 chains; thence Souch 9.5 chains; thence East 20 chains 
to the point of beginning, 
PARCEL 10? Beginning 15,28 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section JL9, Township JL 
£outh, Range iJfciest, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; running 
thence North 81°13' East 20.20.chains; thence North 10.24 
chains; thence South 81°13' West 25,52 chains; thence South 
8a43* East 10 chains; thence North 81°15' East 3.66 chains to 
the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 11; The Norcheasc quarter; the East half of the 
Northwest quarter, an Locs 1 and 2 of Section JL, Township^ 
South, Range 5^_West, Sal: Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 12i The East half of the Northwest quarter and the 
South half of the Northeast quarter of Section JJ^ Township J. 
.South, Range JL-Kest, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; the West half 
^f the Southwest quarter of Seccion ^ , Township 6 South. Range 
3 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
PARCEL 13? The West half of the Northeast quarter; the South 
half of the Northwesc quarter; Che West half of the'Southeast 
quarter and the SOuchwest quarter of Seccion_lZ, Township JL 
South, Range J.Jdtst, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; West half of 
the Northeast quarter and Northwest quarter of Section 20. 
Township 7 South, Range 6 Wesc, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 14? The following described real property in Tooele 
County, State of Ucah; The Golden Eagle Lode Mining claim 
described as follows, co-wic: Mineral patent, Certificate No. 
0638. Survey No, 5841, embracing a portion of Township J_&puth 
of Range 4 West> Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in the Ophir " 
Mining District in the Councy of Tooele, State of Utah? 
Beginning at corner No. 1 marfced 1-5841, from which U.S. 
Mineral Monument No. 1 bears South 78°53( West 1640.8 feet 
distant; thence first course, South 72°43' East 2 feet 
intersect line 4*5, an Cast line of Lot No. 162, the Grand 
Culch Lode Claim; 152,4 feec intersect line 2*3 of Lot No. 
15i*B, the Baltic Mill Site Claim, at South 16°40l West 203.1 
feet from corner No, 2; 600 feet to corner No, 2 marked 2-5841, 
from which discovery cut bears North 26*10' West 416.9 feet 
distant; thence, second course, North 19°48' East 1198,3 feet 
•3-
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intersect line 2-3 of che Vile No, A, Lode Claim survey No, 
5623 at South 76°55' Ease $80,3 feet from Corner Ho. 2; 1500 
feet to corner No. 3, marked 3-5841; thence third course North 
72°43' West 600 feec to corner No, 4 marked 4-5841; thence, 
fourth course, South 19°48' West 248.5 feet intersect line 3-4 
of the Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, Survey No. 5623 and line 1-2 of 
laid Nile No. 4 Lode Claim, at Norch 6°24» East 297.4 feet and 
97.4 feec from corners Nos. 3 and 2 respectively; 545.9 feet 
intersect line 2*3 of said Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, ac Norch 
76°53' Wesc 69,4 feec from corner No. 3; 927.9 feec incersect 
line 2*3 of Survey No, 5535, che Bell No, 3 Lode Claim, ac 
Norch 10° Ease 103,7 feet from corner No, 2, 1027.3 feec 
intersect line 1-2 of said Survey No, 5535, at Norch 61f 30' 
Wesc 17.8 feec from Corner No. 2; 1298,2 feec incersecc line 
1*2 of said Loc No. 151-B< ac Norch 71* 20' Wesc 141.4 fete from 
corner No. 2; 1494.4 feec incersect said line 4-5 of Lot No. 
162; 1500 feet to corner No. 1, the place of beginning; 
expressly excepting and excluding from these presents all that 
portion of the ground hereinbefore described, embraced in said 
mining claims or Survey N'o, 5535; said Locs Nos 151*B and 162; 
said Nile No, 3, Nile No. 4 Lode Claims Survey No. 5623 and 
also all Chac porcion of said Golden Eagle vein or lode and of 
all veins, lodes, and ledges chroughouc Cheir encire depch, che 
tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground; 
said survey No. 5841, excending 1500 feec in lengch along.che 
Golden Eagle vein or lode; che premises herein granted, 
containing 15.274 acres, more or less. 
All of Lots 6, 7, and 8 and Che East 150 feet of Lot 9, Block 
11, the East half of LoC 7, Block 12, all of Locs 2 Co 8 
inclusive, Block 13; all of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 14; 
All of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 15; all of Locs 2 Co 8 
inclusive, Block 17; all of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 18; 
all of Locs 1 Co 10 inclusive, Block 19; all of Block 20; all 
of Lot 9, Block 21, all of Block 22, except Lot 1; all of Block 
23, except the West half of Lots 1, 2, and 3. All L O C J and 
blocks described in this paragraph are located in Plat "A"; 
Ophir Survey, Togecher wich all wacer righes appurcenanc Co 
"the foregoing pacenced mining claims and ocher propercy 
including buC noc limited Co chose wacer righes awarded co 
Annie Worching and Charles D. Daniels, described in paragraph 
VI in Che decree of che District Courc of Tooele Councy, daced 
December 20, 1919 in che case of 'Ophir Creek Wacer Company, a 
corporacion, plaintiff vs. Ophir Kill Consolidaced Mining 
Company, a corporacion, defendanc. 
PARCEL 15; The Norcheasc quarCe'r of Che Norcheast quarter of 
Section Jij Township JLJ-Puch, Range JLWesc, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, excepcing road and portion conveyed co Warren and 
Gertrude Penney, 
PARCEL 16; Locs 3, 4, and 5 of Section .4U Township JL0 Slouch, 
JUnge _3 ffesti Salt Lake Base and Meridiani 
PARCEL 17; Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 and the Southeast quarter of 
the Southwest quarter of Sectionj5t> Township 10 South, Range.JL^ 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 18; Beginning ac the cencer of SecCion l&j Township 5 
Souch, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running 
thence Norch 298 feec; chence Ease 1320 feec; chence Souch 30.5 
feet; thence West 577,5 feec; chence Souch 247,5 feec; Chence 
Wesc 742.5 ftec to the poinc of beginning. 
.4* 
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PARCEL 19; The North half of Section li, Township 3 South. 
Range 3 "Westt Salt Lake Base and Meridian. " 
PARCEL 20? The Northwest quarter of Section J4j Township J. 
South, Rangej West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
PARCEL 21: The North half of the Northeast quarter; the 
South half of the Norcheasc quarter of Section Xiu Township J., 
South, Range JLi^st, Sale Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 22; The South half of the Norchwest quarter and the 
Northwest quarter of che Souchwesc quarcer of Section .1.4,. 
Township i_Squch. Range 6 Wesc, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 23; Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 
of Section JLflU Township4 South. Range 3 West. Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. Lots 4 and 3; che Norch half of the Northeast 
quarter, the Soucheasc quarcer of the Northeast quarter of 
Section JJ^ Township 4 Souch, Range Litest, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; also the Soucheasc quarcer of the Southeast quarter 
of SectionJJ, Township 4 Souch, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base 
and MeridianT " " 
PARCEL 24; The South half of the Souchwest quarter of 
Section 12, Township 55puch, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian?"" 
PARCEL 23; The-East half of Che Southwest quarter; the 
Southwest quarter of che Souchwesc quarter of Section^JJL 
Township 5 Souch, Range ^J^st, Sale Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 26; S e c t i o n ^ Township J, South, Range i^West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 27; East half of che NorChwest quarter; the Northeast 
quarter of the Souchwesc quarcer; Locs 1, 2, and 3 of Section 
j j , Township 3 Souch, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 28; Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and che East half of the West 
half and the West half of che Ease half of Section_7, Township 
3 South. Range 3 Wesc, Sale Lake Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL 29; All of SectionJ^, Township j_S.ouch, Range JuHftt 
of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Containing 7017.32 acres, more or less. 
Subject to existing rights of way, 
TOGETHER with the following wacer rights as more fully 
described in the accion encicled Ophir Creek Waeer Company vs. 
Ophir Kill Consolidaeed Mining Company, daced December 20, 
1919, in the Districc Courc in and for Tooele Councy: 
The water rights decreed Co Annie Worthing in paragraph VI of 
said decree being a right for 10,000 gallons of wacer each 24 
hours from the pipeline of Ophir Hill Consolidaeed Mining 
Company and 23/100 c.f.s, from che nacural flow of Ophir Creek 
all for the irrigation of Coiden Eagle Lode Mining Claim Survey 
5841. 
ALSO together with all stock water rights used in the operation 
of this livestock unit. 
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Hecla, Hecla No, 1, Hecla No. 2, Hecla No. 3 and Hecla No. 4, 
V,$. Survey 3079, containing 66.240 acres, more or lest. 
Black Shale, U.S. Survey 3029, containing 19.945 acres, more or 
less. 
Douglas No. 1, \J,S. Survey 3142, containing 27,830 acres, more 
or less. 
Buena Vista, Cold Button, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No, 2, 
Mary Jean Fraction, U.S. Survey 3231, containing 57.127 acres, 
more or less. 
Granite Mountain, (aka Crannec Mt. No. 4,) Quartet No, 1, 
Kansas Boy, Kansas Boy Fraccion, Kansas Boy No. 3 and Kansas 
Boy No. 4, U.S. Survey 3681 (should be Survey No. 3935), 80.973 
acres. 
Syndicate No, I, Syndicate No. 2, U.S. Survey 3487 and 
Monopolist Nos 1 to 8 inclusive, U,S. Survey 3487, containing 
107,40 acres, 
Ivanhoe, Albion, Coin and Try Again, U,S, Survey 4192, 64.376 
acres, 
West Shore, Selma, Vest Selma, Sister Mary, Four O'clock, 
Alice, Esther, Maggie Kelly, Honest Dick, Lola Barker and Black 
Sheep, U.S. Survey 3164, containing 184,27 acres. 
NfcJj of NE less 3.09 ac, at road Comm. " Also 6.91 ac. to 
Warrant & Gertrude Fenney. All in Ser. 15, T. 5 8., R. 5 W. 
Lots 3, 4, 5, Sec. A, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M, cont. 96.58 
acres, 
Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, SE o.f SW*, Sec 5, T. 10 S, R. 5 W. S.L.B, 
cont. 170,04 acres. 
Beg. at center of Sec. , T. 5 , R. W., 238 ft; C. 
1320 ft.;
 —
 50Jj ft. W.~T77i* ft; S, ~ ft; tT ft; 
to beginning, cont. 4.13 acres. 
w
 °* HE i SJ* ot N H _ - of IE ot Stc' 17» T* 
7 T . , R7"T"W,, S.L.M. cone. A00 acres. 
W of NE , NW of Sec. 20, T, 7 S , , R. 6 W. S,L.M. cont. 
Z75 acres. 
ft °* NW
 t L-. of N _ of Sec. 13, T. 5 S,, R. 5 W. , S.L.M. 
cone. 240 acres, 
NW of Sec 14, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M, cont. 160 acres, 
N of NE , S. of NE of Sec. 14, T, 5 S,f R. 5 W,, S.L.M. 
cont. 160 acres. 
SW of NW t N of SW
 t Sec. 14, T. 6 S., R. 6 W., 
cont, 120 acres. 
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, A 27. Sec. 30, T. 4 
S,, R. 3 W,, S.L.M, Lots 4 and 5; NE ; SB NE ; Sec. 
31 T, 4 S., R. 3 W. , S.L.M. SE _, SE Sec. 25 T T 7 S., R. 
4 W., S.L.M, Con. in all 546.30 acres, 
5 of NE , Sec, 13, T. 5 S,, R. 5 W., SL.M. cone, _ acres. 
8% of S , Sec. 12, T, 3 S,, R. S^W., S.L.M, cone. 80 acres. 
of SW , SW of SW Sec. 11, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M. 
cont. 120 acres, 
•6-
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and having been recorded on July 6, 1987, in the office of the 
Tooele County Recorder as Entry No. 010641, in Book 258, pages 220-
224 is hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid. 
DATED this j T ^ day of VM^V*-\*. , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment on Verdict was hand delivered to: Wendell P. Abies, 536 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
DATED this £ ^ day of March, 1990. 
'. Franklin Allred 
attorney for Petitioner 
Gene J. Russell 
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TOOELE, UTAH; MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989; P.M. SESSION 
THF COURT: Did you want to make a proffer of 
testimony, Mr. Allred, as to what this witness will say? 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor T will, if I may lay a 
little ground work. I contacted the questioned document 
examiner in November, as she indicated, and at that time, 
the court will recall, I did not have any corrections to 
Georgia Russell's deposition, so I provided her with all of 
what v/e thought would be evidence in this case, and I 
obtained opinions on a number of items. 
First that that signature on that August 14th 
unnotarized agreement cancelling the antenuptial agreement: 
was not ;4er Russell's signature, and it toolc us a lot of 
exhaustive effort to find that out. 
Secondly, that the characteristics inherent in 
that signature, if I am correct here, indicate that it was a 
person disguising their own handwriting. And thirdly, there 
are additional documents, all of which I obtained from Mr. 
SKeenfs files. No document here came from anywhere else but 
Fd Sfceen's files. There were no oojectionns filed to the 
foundation of them. Other documents are relevant in maxing 
the comparisons and the conclusion that she has made, and so 
we have a witness whose testimony I believe we are entitled 
to offer. 
THE COURT: Hold on a second. She is going to 
1 testify that the August 14th document was not signed by Mer 
2 Russell; that it was signed by someone who was attempting to 
3 disguise their own handwriting, and the other documents are 
4 just comparison documents which she used to make this 
5 conclusion? 
6 iVR. ALLRED: Yes. One of them is — we have a 
7 page of Georgia Russell^ handwriting, and we said in the 
3 exhibits we were going to bring — 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. ALLRED: — that we needed sufficient samples, 
11 and we have that sufficient sample, which is that document. 
12 THE COURT: Those other documents, what they say 
13 isn't relevant. The point there is the handwriting style? 
14 MR. ALLRED: The handwriting style. We are just 
15 looking at her analysis from a standpoint of an expert. 
15 THE COURT: Fine. 
17 MR. ALLRED: All these other documents, the deed 
13 and cancellation of the antenuptial agreement. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. All we are looking for is 
20 handwriting style; doesnft matter what they are. They could 
21 be love letters for all you care? 
22 MR. ALLRED: That is correct. 
23 THE COURT: Hold on. *Tow are you going to — .Mr. 
24 Abies, are you going to contest either of those two facts: 
25 Either that this document of August 14th was not signed by 
1 Merv Russell or that it was signed by someone attempting to 
2 disguise their own handwriting? 
3 MR. ABLES: It was signed by Georgia Russell on 
4 August 14th, we stipulate to that. And I think that 
5 question of disguising, I don't think that's relevant at 
6 all. She has admitted she signed it. 
7 THE COURT: You are not going to — 
8 MR. ABLES: Let me — Mr. Skeen's deposition — I 
9 mean this — I don't think you need a real swift document 
10 examiner for that because he handed this same document to Ed 
11 Skeen, who is about 84 years old; asked him if — in whose 
12 handwriting it was. He says, "It looks like Georgia's to 
13 me." 
14 THE COURT: You aren't going to contest, then, 
15 that it appears to have been written by someone who was 
16 disguising their testimony. You won't agree to that, right? 
17 MR. ABLES: I think — well, I don't know whether 
13 that is relevant or not. 
19 THE COURT: It is relevant. My question is do you 
20 agree to it? It i3 clearly relevant. She is going to say 
21 looks like someone disguising their handwriting. There is 
22 no question it is relevant. If your objection is relevancy 
23 I will overrule that objection. If you will stipulate to 
24 tnat, then she doesn't need to testify. So you just say and 
25 we can get on with it. 
MR. ALLRED: I wonder if I might say one other 
2 thing, your Honor. Here's why it is important. This comes 
3 back to the Rule 30(e) dealing with filing of depositions. 
4 THE COURT: I have already ruled that it is 
5 important. That's okay. 
6 MR. ALLRED: That's okay? 
7 THE COURT: I ruled in your favor on that. You 
3 donft need to talk me into it. 
9 I just need to know whether you agree to it, Mr. 
10 Abies. 
11 MR. ABLES: All right. We will stipulate to that. 
12 THE COURT: What we are going to tell the jury, 
13 then, is that you will agree that she examined the 
14 documents. When? 
15 THE WITNESS: November. 
io THE COURT: When did she examine them? When did 
17 she give you her conclusion? 
18 MR. ALLRED: I think we got the conclusion — 
19 THE WITNESS: It was November. November, but I am 
20 sorry, but I don't have the date on the top of my head. 
21 THE COURT: November of 19 — 
22 THE WITNESS: '88. 
23 THE COURT: At that time she gave you her 
24 conclusions, which are that, number one, the August 14th 
25 signature of Mer Russell was not written by him; and 
secondly, that in her opinion it was written by someone 
attempting to disguise their own handwriting* 
MR* ABLES: That's right* 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, there is additional 
testimony. 
THE COURT: And that is* 
MR* ALLRED: That two of those documents 
purporting — an addition purporting to be his signature, 
which shows, I thinkr a scheme or a plan, were not authored 
by him, and those document are exhibits number — 
THE WITNESS: My testimony is that Mr. Russell did 
not sign the agreement cancelling the antenuptial agreement 
on 8-^ 4-82, which i3 known to me as Q-l. He did not 
authorize — author a release that was done on 1-12-84, and 
he did not author a grazing permit signed after his death 
that was executed on 1-12-87. 
MR. ABLES: Well, those agreements — all those 
things are irrelevant and immaterial to the determination of 
his mental capacity and — 
THE COURT: Let's 3ee those two documents, the 
1-12-84. What are they again? 
MR. ABLES: One of them is posthumous. 
THE WITNESS: The documents I say were not signed 
by Mr. Russell are Q-lf 2, 3 and Q-4. 
THE COURT: I need more of the signature. I need 
1 the documents. Have you got the documencs there on — 
2 m. ALLRED: I think they are — 
3 MR. ABLES: We stipulate she signed those two. 
4 She will stipulate she signed those two. 
5 THE COURT: Now, are you also going to testify 
5 that these documents were also signed by someone attempting 
7 to disguise their handwriting? 
8 THE WITNESS: I am not going to say that was an 
9 attempted signing. Cnly Q-l was, in my ooinion. 
10 THE COURT: Well, you can stipulate to that toof 
11 than. On document August 14th, she will say that it wa^ not 
12 signed by Mervin Russell, and that that document was signed 
13 by someone in her opinion who wa3 attempting to disguise 
14 their handwriting; that the document is dated January 26, 
15 '87, and wa3 it January 12th, f84? 
16 THE WITNESS: January 12, f84 and 1-12-8 7 were not 
17 signed by Mr. Russell. 
lb MR. ALLRED: 1-12-87. Don't you mean 1-26-87? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I guess I looked at the 12 
20 that day. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. The other one was the f84 
22 document, was what? 
23 THE WITNESS: I have 1-12-84 on that. Tt was a 
2 4 release that was in with a number of papers that were 
25 stapled together. 
1 THE COURT: Those documents were not signed by 
2 I4ervin Ru3sell, but in her opinion they were not signed by 
3 someone attempting to disguise their own handwriting* 
4 MR. ALLRED: I say this reluctantly, your Honor. 
5 I donft think I should be in a position where I am forced 
6 into a stipulation. The other facts that the document 
7 examiner concluded and related to me in advance of the time 
8 that the deposition was filed, that Georgia signed the 
9 signature on Q-1 or the agreement cancelling the antenuptial 
10 release. 
11 THE COURT: Is that right? 
12 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: Do you stipulate to that? 
14 MR. ABLES: Antenuptial agreement; that Georgia 
15 signed it? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. ABLES: No. The antenuptial? 
lb THE COURT: You mean the document cancelling the 
19 antenuptial agreement? 
20 MR. ABLES: Which day is that? 
21 THE COURT: The August 14 document. 
22 .MR. ALLRED: August 14f 1982. 
23 LMR. A3LES: Well, there is only one document we 
24 are talking about. 
25 THE COURT: Right. 
MR, ALLRED: We had knowledge of that prior to the 
time they changed their answers in the deposition. And 
prior to the time 3he changed her answers in the deoosicion 
they had knowledge we had a questioned document — 
THE COURT: I am not going to characterize IC liice 
that* I am going the characterize it in terms of when she 
did tell you, which was November 1983. You can show later 
when the deposition was corrected if you want. 
MR. ALLRED: Are we certain on that time? 
THE WITNESS: I don't believe so until we got this 
other handwritten letter from Louise. 
THE COURT: When did you tell him that? 
THE WITNESS: When did I come to your office? 
MR. ALLRED: January or so of f89. 
THE WITNESS: Do you recall the exact date I 
picked up another packet of documents? There were Drobaoly 
six at that time. I do not have them with me, but I did 
make copies of them. 
THE COURT: Well what's your best escimate of when 
that was? 
MR. ALLRED: I have got a receipt on it nere, I 
thinfc. 
THE COURT: If you have got something that 
refreshes her memory, that is good. 
THE WITNESS: It's been this winter, though. 
MR. ALLRED: I think it was right around the time 
of the pre-trial. 
THE COURT: I want her testimony. 
THE WITNESS: This is the what I am talking about. 
MR. ALLRED: Right. When you picked those up. 
Did you keep your copy of the receipt? 
THE WITNESS: John, I probably did and T.don't 
know if I have it with me. 
MR* ALLRED: She wrote me a receipt for the 
document. 
THE WITNESS: And he made a copy. 
MR. ALLRED: And I got a copy. 
Did you find it? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, do you remember — Will you 
resume the witness stand? 
THE WITNESS: I am sorry. 
MR. ALLRED: You can tell him. 
THE COURT: Now, my question is, do you remember 
when it was you told him that? 
THE WITNESS: I picked up that particular document 
on 5-11-89. 
THE COURT: What I want to know, when you told Mr. 
Alired that you thought it was Georgia's signature. 
THE WITNESS: It would have been 5-11 or 5-12 of 
•39
 f then* That Georgia in fact had authored our Q-l, which 
is the cancellation, 
THE COURT: So was about ten or 12 days ago? 
THE WITNESS: Yes* 
THE COURT: Okay* 5-11 or 5-12 of fS9. Okay. 
Thatfs what her testimony will be* 
MR. ALLRED: They learned about our document 
examiner on the 16th of May and their changes in answers 
where delivered to me on the 18th of May, just one day 
before our final pre-trail. 
THE COURT: You can establish that some other way. 
This witness doesn't know that. You can establish that 
later, so long as you can get in when she told you about the 
document. 
Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr, Abies? 
MR, ABLES: May I hear it one more time? T think 
it is brief, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. In November of 1988 — this 
witness examined some documents in November of 1988. She 
gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that the August 14th document 
was not signed by Mervin Russell in her opinion. Secondly, 
that it was signed by some other person attempting to 
disguise their own handwriting. That on May 11th or 12th of 
1989 she came to the conclusion and indicated to Mr. Allred 
that the person who had signed it was Georgia Russell. And 
1 secondly that there are two other documents which she looked 
2 at, one dated January 12th, 1984 — exhibit what? Do you 
3 know? 
4 THE WITNESS: Plaintiffs exhibit — 
5 MR. ALLRED: It is in a packet in Plaintiffs1 57, 
6 your Honor, and it is identified as a release. 
7 THE COURT: Well, take it out and have it marked 
8 separately. The whole packet doesnft need to be in. Have 
9 it marked a different number. 
10 MR. ALLRED: I think maybe — could we keep it an 
11 integral document; put 57-A on it, as part of it? 
12 THE COURT: Thatfs fine. 
13 MR. ALLRED: I hate to lose them because I think 
14 they are all relevant that way. 
15 THE COURT: 57-A is fine. 
16 MR. ALLRED: Plaintiffs 57-A is a integral part of 
17 57. 
IB THE COURT: And January 26, '87 document is what? 
19 MR. ALLRED: Yes. That's 60. 
20 THE COURT: 50? Those documents were signed — 
21 were — were not signed by Mervin Russell but in her 
22 opinion they were not signed by someone attempting to 
23 disguise their handwriting. 
24 MR. ABLE3: That's right, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Let's call the jury back in. 
1 MR* ABLES: In addition to that we stipulated — 
2 we did stipulate in addition to the opinion of the examiner 
3 — we stipulated that Mrs. Russell signed the document dated 
4 August 14th of 1982, whatever number it bears, and also she 
5 signed exhibits 57 and 60. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. ALLRED: I donft think that should be part of 
8 the stipulation. T think it should show that they are 
9 stipulating to the testimony as accuratef and not get in 
10 there to start out making their excuses. 
11 THE COURT: I guess that's right. 
12 MR. ABLES: We aren't going to enter testimony — 
13 MR. ALLRED: I am sure you are going to. You have 
14 got all that right. 
15 THE COURT: You can put that in. That's not part 
16 of this witness's testimony. 
17 MR. ALLRED: Thank you, your Honor. Okay. 
13 Well, it is time for a recess, anyway. I don't know whether 
19 to bring them back and let them go on a recess, or just take 
20 a few minutes. 
21 THE COURT: Let's take five minutes more. We 
22 will call them in at five minute to four and proceed then. 
23 MR. ALLRED: Before your Honor leaves, I wonder if 
24 we might have a finding for the record for the witness's 
25 curriculum vitae. She did qualify as an expert witness in 
this court. 
TKS COURT: Any oojection, Mr. Abies? 
MR. ABLES: None. 
THE COURT: That will be fine. 
Okay. We will be in recess for five minutes. 
(Short recess taken.) 
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